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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present F2ED-LEARNING, the first federated learning protocol
simultaneously defending against both a semi-honest server and Byzantine mali-
cious clients. Using a robust mean estimator called FilterL2, F2ED-LEARNING
is the first FL protocol providing dimension-free estimation error against Byzan-
tine malicious clients. Besides, F2ED-LEARNING leverages secure aggregation to
protect the clients from a semi-honest server who wants to infer the clients’ infor-
mation from the legitimate updates. The main challenge stems from the incom-
patibility between FilterL2 and secure aggregation. Specifically, to run FilterL2,
the server needs to access individual updates from clients while secure aggre-
gation hides those updates from it. We propose to split the clients into shards,
securely aggregate each shard’s updates and run FilterL2 on the updates from dif-
ferent shards. The evaluation shows that F2ED-LEARNING consistently achieves
optimal or sub-optimal performance under three attacks among five robust FL pro-
tocols.
1 INTRODUCTION
Federated learning (FL) has drawn numerous attention in the past few years as a new distributed
learning paradigm. In federated learning, the users collaboratively train a model with the help of a
centralized server when all the data is held locally to preserve the users’ privacy. The privacy guaran-
tee can be further enhanced using secure aggregation technique (Bonawitz et al., 2017) which hides
the individual local updates and only reveals the aggregated global update. The graceful balance
between utility and privacy popularizes federated learning in a variety of sensitive applications such
as Google GBoard, healthcare service and self-driving cars.
The above threat model assumes that all the users honestly upload their local updates. However, it is
likely that a small number of clients are malicious in a large-scale FL system with tens of thousands
of clients. Besides, in most SGD-based FL algorithms used today (McMahan & Ramage, 2017),
the centralized server averages the local updates to obtain the global update, which is vulnerable to
even only one malicious client. Therefore, a malicious client can arbitrarily craft its update to either
prevent the global model from converging or lead it to a sub-optimal minimum. This kind of attack
in federated learning is well-studied by Bhagoji et al. (2019); Fang et al. (2019); Bagdasaryan et al.
(2020); Sun et al. (2020).
To mitigate these attacks, various Byzantine-robust FL protocols (Blanchard et al., 2017; Yin et al.,
2018; Fu et al., 2019; Pillutla et al., 2019) are proposed to reduce the impact of the contaminated
updates. These protocols replace trivial averaging with well-designed Byzantine-robust mean esti-
mators. These estimators suppress the influence of the malicious updates and output a mean estima-
tion as accurate as possible. Nevertheless, almost all of these aggregators suffer from the curse of
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dimensionality. Specifically, the estimation error scales up with the size of the model in a square-
root fashion. As a concrete example, a three-layer MLP on MNIST contains more than 50,000
parameters and leads to a 223-fold increase of the estimation error, which is prohibitive in practice.
Draco (Chen et al., 2018) and BULYAN (Mhamdi et al., 2018) are the only two works that state to
yield dimension-free estimation error. However, Draco is designed for distributed learning and is
incompatible with federated learning because it requires redundant updates from each worker. On
the other hand, although Bulyan (Mhamdi et al., 2018) provides dimension-free estimation error, it
is based on much stronger assumptions than other works. When the assumptions are relaxed to the
common case, Bulyan’s estimation error still scales up with the square root of the model size as
discussed in Section 2.
In addition, these robust FL protocols have incompatible implementation with secure aggregation
techniques. The robust estimators have to access local updates while secure aggregation hides them
from the server. Consequently, the system cannot simultaneously protect the server and the clients,
but has to place complete trust in either of them. The lack of two-way protection severely harms
the people’s confidence in the FL system and prevents federated learning from being used in many
sensitive applications such as home monitoring and self-driving cars.
Contribution. In this paper, we propose FEDERATED LEARNING WITH FENCE, abbreviately
F2ED-LEARNING. F2ED-LEARNING integrates a robust mean estimator with dimension-free er-
ror (Steinhardt, 2018) and secure aggregation (Bonawitz et al., 2017) to defend against both the
Byzantine malicious clients and the semi-honest server. In particular, F2ED-LEARNING is the first
Byzantine-robust FL system with dimension-free estimation error. To address the incompatibility,
the clients are split into multiple shards, the local updates from the same shard are securely aggre-
gated at the centralized server, and the robust estimator is run on the aggregated local updates from
different shards. Surprisingly, sharding also consolidates the independently and identically dis-
tributed (IID) assumption required by the robust estimator even under heterogeneous data distribu-
tion. According to Lindeberg central limitation theorem (Lindeberg, 1922), despite the heterogene-
ity of the individual local updates, the aggregated local updates from the shards will approximately
follow an IID Gaussian distribution.
2 LOOPHOLE IN BULYAN & RELATED WORK
Byzantine-robust aggregation has drawn enormous attention in the past few years due to the emer-
gence of various distributed attacks in federated learning. Fang et al. (2019) formalize the attack as
an optimization problem and successfully migrate the data poisoning attack to federated learning.
The proposed attacks even work under Byzantine-robust federated learning. Sun et al. (2020) man-
age to launch data poisoning attack on the multi-task federated learning framework. Bhagoji et al.
(2019) and Bagdasaryan et al. (2020) even manage to insert backdoor functionalities into the model
via local model poisoning or local model replacement.
A variety of Byzantine-robust FL protocols are proposed to defend against these attacks.
Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017) picks the subset of updates with enough close neighbors and averages
the subset. Yin et al. (2018) leverage traditional robust estimators like trimmed mean or median to
achieve order-optimal statistical error rate under strongly convex assumptions. Mhamdi et al. (2018)
pointed out that Krum, trimmed mean and median all suffers from O(
√
d) (d is the model size) es-
timation error and proposed a general framework Bulyan to reduce the error to O(1). However, we
point out that the improvement of Bulyan actually comes from its stronger assumption. In particu-
lar, Bulyan assumes that expectation of the distance between two benign updates is bounded by a
constant σ1, while Krum assumes that the distance is bounded by σ2
√
d. We can easily see that if
σ1 = σ2
√
d, Bulyan falls back to the same order of estimation error as Krum. Consequently, there
is no known federated learning protocol with dimension-free estimation error against Byzantine
adversaries.
2
Preprint. Under Review.
3 PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we review the general pipeline of federated learning, introduce the threat model, and
establish the notation system. We use bold lower-case letters (e.g. a,b,c) to denote vectors, and bold
upper-case letters (e.g. A, B, C) for matrices. We denote 1 · · ·n with [n].
Federated Learning Pipeline. In a federated learning system, there are one server S andm clients
Ci, i ∈ [m]. Each client holds data samples drawn from some unknown distributionD. Let ℓ(w; z) be
the loss function on the model parameterw ∈ Rd and a data sample z. LetL(w) = Ez∼D[ℓ(w; z)] be
the population loss function. Our goal is to learn the model w such that the population loss function
is minimized:
w∗ = arg min
w∈W
L(w).
To learnw∗, the whole system runs a T -round federated learning protocol. Initially, the server stores
a global modelw0. In the t
th round,S broadcasts the global modelwt−1 to them clients. The clients
then run the local optimizers (e.g. SGD, Adam, and RMSprop), compute the difference g
(i)
t between
the optimized model and the global model, and upload the difference to S. In the tth round, S takes
the average of the differences and update the global model wt = wt−1 +
1
m
∑m
i=1 g
(i)
t .
Threat Model & Defence Goal. We assume that the centralized server S is semi-honest. The
server can launch whatever attacks such as inference attack using legitimate updates from the clients
as the only inputs. However, the server cannot deviate from the protocol for the sake of regulation
or reputation pressure. On the other hand, we assume that the clients are ǫ-Byzantine malicious,
which means at most ǫm clients can be malicious. Malicious clients can arbitrarily deviate from the
protocol and tamper with their own updates without being detected.
In this paper, we aim to achieve a dimension-free error for the mean estimation in each round. Let
µ be the true mean of the benign distribution and the output of a protocol with contaminated inputs
be µˆ. The estimation error is defined by the ℓ2 distance between the true mean and the estimation
‖µˆ− µ‖2.
4 F2ED-LEARNING: ROBUST PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED FL
In this section, we formally present our main protocol: F2ED-LEARNING. We first introduce F2ED-
LEARNING step by step and formally establish the robustness and security guarantees. Then we
discuss the effect of sharding on the IID distribution assumption.
4.1 F2ED-LEARNING: BYZANTINE-ROBUST PRIVACY-PRESERVING FEDERATED LEARNING
The complete F2ED-LEARNING protocol is presented in Algorithm 1. F2ED-LEARNING iteratively
executes the following steps: (1) the server broadcasts the global model to the clients; (2) clients
train the global model with their local data; (3) clients in the same shard run secure aggregation
protocol to upload the mean of their updates to the server; (4) the server aggregates the received
updates using robust mean estimation; (5) the server updates the global model with the aggregated
global update. We highlight step (3) and (4) newly proposed in F2ED-LEARNING.
Sharded Secure Aggregation (line 8-10, 12, 16). Secure aggregation is developed
by Bonawitz et al. (2017) to defend against the honest but curious server in federated learning. Se-
cure aggregation allows the server to obtain the sum of the clients’ updates but hides the individual
updates cryptographically. We introduce an oversimplified version of secure aggregation as follows
for the ease of clarification. As the first step, each client samples random values for the other clients
and send the values to the corresponding clients (line 8-10). After receiving all the values from
other clients, each client sums up the received values and subtracts the values generated by itself
to produce a random mask (line 12). Each client blinds its local update with the random mask and
sends the blinded update to the server (line 13). The server then sums up all the blinded updates
and obtains the summed update in plaintext (line 15). Obviously, all the masks cancel out during
aggregation and the server receives the plaintext sum. Secure aggregation provides strong privacy
3
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Algorithm 1: F2ED-LEARNING: Robust Privacy-Preserving Sharded Federated Learning.
1 for t← [T ] do
2 Server:
3 Splitm clients into p shards {Hj}j∈[p]
4 Broadcast {Hj}j∈[p] and the global model wt−1 to all the clients
5 Client:
6 foreach client i ∈ [m] do
7 Locate its own shard j
8 Generate random masks u
(j)
ik , k ∈ Hj/i
9 foreach k ∈ Hj/i do
10 Send uik to k
11 Train the local model w
(i)
t using wt as initialization
12 g
(i)
t = w
(i)
t − wt−1 +
∑
k 6=i,i∈Hj ,k∈Hj
u
(j)
ik −
∑
k 6=i,i∈Hj ,k∈Hj
u
(j)
ki
13 Send g
(i)
t to the server
14 Server:
15 foreachHj ∈ {Hj}j∈[p] do
16 g
Hj
t =
∑
k∈Hj
g
(k)
t
17 gt = FilterL2({gHjt }j∈[p])
18 wt = wt−1 + gt
guarantee for the clients that the server cannot see anything but the aggregated global update and
each client is hidden in thousands of other clients.
However, in our threat model, vanilla secure aggregation is insufficient since it provides no protec-
tion for the server. As the individual updates are completely hidden, there is no way that the server
can identify the malicious clients even after detecting the attack. To address the issue, we propose
to split the clients into multiple shards and run secure aggregation within each shard. The size of
the shards provides a trade-off between the protection for the server or the clients. The smaller the
size is, the more information is revealed to the server, thus the easier to defend against Byzantine
malicious clients and the harder to fight off the semi-honest server. The trade-off is discussed in
detail in Section 4.2.
Robust Mean Estimation (line 17). The core step in Byzantine-robust federated learning is to
estimate the true mean of the benign updates as accurate as possible even with some malicious
clients. The most commonly used aggregator, averaging, is proven to be vulnerable to even only
one malicious client. All other works addressing the issue such as Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017)
and Bulyan (Mhamdi et al., 2018) suffer from a dimension-dependent estimation error. Such error
is unacceptable even for training a 3-layer MLP on MNIST, not to mention more complicated tasks
and models such as VGG16 or ResNet50.
Actually, the above problem is well studied in statistics under the name “robust mean esti-
mation” and there already exist several robust mean estimators with dimension-free estimation
error (Diakonikolas et al. (2019); Charikar et al. (2017); Steinhardt (2018); Cheng et al. (2019);
Dong et al. (2019)). Therefore, instead of reinventing the wheel, we choose to leverage a repre-
sentative robust mean estimator: FilterL2 (Algorithm 2). The following formulation is related to the
presentation given in Steinhardt (2018).
Specifically, FilterL2 assigns each update a weight and iteratively updates the weights until the
weights for the malicious updates are small enough. As mentioned, FilterL2 provides dimension-
free error rate formally presented as follows.
Theorem 1. Let D be the honest dataset and D∗ be the contaminated version of D by inserting
malicious samples. Suppose that |D∗| ≤ |D|/(1− ǫ), ǫ ≤ 112 , and further suppose thatMEAN[D] =
µ and ‖COV[D]‖op ≤ σ2. Then given D∗, Algorithm 2 outputs µˆ s.t. ‖µˆ− µ‖2 = O(σ
√
ǫ) using
POLY(n, d) time.
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Algorithm 2: FilterL2: dimension-free robust mean estimation (Steinhardt (2018)).
Input: x1, · · · , xn ∈ Rd, η > 1
1 Let c1, · · · , cn = 1
2 µˆc = (
∑n
i=1 cixi)/(
∑n
i=1 ci)
3 Σˆc = (
∑n
i=1 ci(xi − µˆc)(xi − µˆc)⊤)/(
∑n
i=1 ci)
4 Let v be the maximum eigenvector of Σˆc, and let σˆ
2
c = v
⊤
Σˆcv
5 if σˆ2c ≤ ησ2 then return µˆc
6 else let τ = 〈xi − µˆc〉2, and update ci ← ci · (1− τi/τmax), where τmax = maxi τi
7 Go back to line 2
AlthoughAlgorithm 2 only takes polynomial time to run, the per-round time complexity isO(nd2) if
implemented with power iteration. Given d is large, the running time is still quite expensive in prac-
tice. To address the issue, we cut the update vectors into k sections and apply the robust estimator to
each of the sections. The acceleration scheme reduces the per-round running time to O(nd2/k) but
increases the estimation error to O(σ
√
k). For instance, if we take k =
√
d, the per-round running
time becomes O(nd) while the estimation error grows to O(σ 4
√
σ2d). Despite the compromise for
acceleration, FilterL2 still gives the known optimal estimation error and outperforms other robust
FL protocols by multiple magnitudes.
4.2 ROBUSTNESS & SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we rigorously present the security and robustness guarantee of F2ED-LEARNING.
Security Guarantee. We first give the security guarantee of F2ED-LEARNING as follows. Intu-
itively, no more information about the clients except the averaged updates from the shards is revealed
to the centralized server. Thus, each client’s update is hidden in all the other clients in its shard.
Theorem 2 (Security against honest-but-curious server; Informal). There exists a PPT (probabilistic
polynomial Turing machine) simulator which can only see the averaged updates from the shards and
its output is computationally indistinguishable from the transcript of F2ED-LEARNING.
Robustness Guarantee. We now give the formal robustness guarantee of F2ED-LEARNING. Intu-
itively, if the number of shards containing malicious clients is small enough, F2ED-LEARNING can
provide mean estimation with dimension-free error (or quad-root error with the acceleration). The
constant 12 comes from the Proposition 4.1 in Steinhardt (2018).
Theorem 3 (Robustness against Byzantine adversaries). Given the number of clientsm, the number
of shards p and the fraction of corrupted clients ǫ, F2ED-LEARNING provides a mean estimation
with dimension-free error as long as 12ǫm < p.
Remark. Given the formal security and robustness guarantee, we can see that F2ED-LEARNING
actually provides a convenient way to calibrate the protection for the server or the clients. Con-
cretely, F2ED-LEARNING can tolerate up to ⌊ p12⌋− 1malicious clients and hide each honest client’s
update in the mean of ⌊m
p
⌋ updates.
4.3 DISCUSSION ON THE I.I.D. DISTRIBUTION ASSUMPTION
To derive the robustness guarantee of the mean estimator, we assume that the updates from the
benign clients are drawn independently and identically from some distribution D, the largest eigen-
value of whose covariance matrix is bounded by σ. However in federated learning, it is well known
that data from different clients are heterogeneous and thus the updates cannot be viewed as inde-
pendently identically distributed. In this section, we first introduce a novel perspective to formally
describe the heterogeneous data distribution. Then we formally discuss how sharding actually helps
establish the IID assumption needed for Byzantine resilience. The high-level idea is that according
to the central limit theorem, the average of the updates should approximately follow a Gaussian
distribution.
5
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From non-I.I.D. to I.I.D. It is a widely accepted assumption in traditional distributed learning
theory that the updates should be independently and identically distributed. The assumption is rea-
sonable in the sense that the server can decide how to distribute the data to the workers in traditional
distributed learning. However, in federated learning, the data is generated by the clients locally so
the updates are not necessarily and typically not IID distributed. This poses a challenge on the ro-
bustness analysis. Now we propose a novel perspective to conduct robustness analysis in federated
learning. Succinctly, by aggregating the shards first, we are able to reduce the non-IID distribution
to an IID distribution. As the first step, we model the heterogeneous update distribution in federated
learning as follows.
Definition 1 (Heterogeneous Distribution). Each client Ci’s update is drawn from some distribution
Di with finite expected value µi and variance σ2i .
Note that in the definition we use scalar data for the ease of clarification. The formalization can be
easily extended to data vectors by separately considering each dimension. The definition captures
the most important feature that each client’s update is drawn from different distributions.
As the second step, we analyze the influence of sharding on the update distribution. Surprisingly,
sharding pushes the non-IID distribution to a well-regulated IID distribution according to Lindeberg
central limit theorem.
Corollary 1 (Lindeberg Central Limit Theorem (Linnik (1959))). Suppose {X1, · · · , Xn} is a se-
quence of independence random variables (not necessarily identically distributed), each with finite
expected value µi and variance σ
2
i . Define s
2
n =
∑n
i=1 σ
2
i . Suppose that ∀ǫ > 0,
lim
n→∞
1
s2n
n∑
i=1
E[(Xi − µi)2 · 1{|Xi − µi| > ǫsn}] = 0.
Then the distribution of the standardized sums converges towards the standard normal distribution.
1
sn
n∑
i=1
(Xi − µi) d→ N(0, 1)
Give Definition 1 and Corollary 1, it follows naturally that the sharded updates approximately follow
a Gaussian distribution in an IID manner.
Handling Permutation Invariance in Neural Networks. Another remaining issue is the permu-
tation of the parameters in neural networks. Specifically, the neurons in two consecutive layers
can be permuted correspondingly without changing the functionality of the network. Thus, trivially
taking the average within each shard might destroy the parameter structure and severely harm the
performance. We choose to take the old-fashioned solution where the clients are required to share
the same initialization to make sure that the locally learned models are within the same permutation
class. Recently, there is a line of works (Yurochkin et al., 2019a;b; Wang et al., 2020) focusing on
addressing the issue using matching algorithm and Bayesian non-parametric model. We deem it as
an interesting future direction to integrate these works in F2ED-LEARNING.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we want to answer the following questions using empirical evaluation: (1) Does
FilterL2 outperforms other aggregators when used alone? (2) Does F2ED-LEARNING outperform
other robust FL protocols augmented with sharded secure aggregation? (3) Do the sharded updates
follow IID distribution?
5.1 ATTACKS
To answer the above questions, we evaluated the robust estimators without attack and with three
representative attacks.
The first and second attacks we used are the model poisoning attacks from Fang et al. (2019). The
aim of the model poisoning attacks is to increase the error rate of the converged model even facing
6
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Byzantine-robust protocols. In these attacks, the malicious clients search for poisoning updates by
solving an optimization problem. We employ two attacks proposed in their work targeting at Krum
and TrimmedMean. These two attacks are henceforth referred to as Krum attack (KA) and trimmed
mean attack (TMA).
The third attack we considered is a backdoor attack from Bhagoji et al. (2019). The attack aims to
insert a backdoor functionality while preserving high accuracy on the validation set. Similarly, the
search for the attack gradient is formalized as an optimization problem and the authors tweak the
objective function with some stealth metrics to make the attack gradient hard to detect. We refer to
the attack as Model Poisoning Attack (MPA) in the rest of the section.
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We selected two datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al. (2010)) and FashionMNIST (Xiao et al.
(2017)), and three other Byzantine-robust federated learning protocols to compare with:
(1) Krum (Blanchard et al. (2017)); (2) Trimmed Mean (Yin et al. (2018)); and (3)
Bulyan (Mhamdi et al. (2018)). Note that Bulyan acts like a wrapper around other robust estimators
so in the evaluation we have two versions of Bulyan: Bulyan Krum and Bulyan TrimmedMean. We
ran all the protocols on the two datasets and present the attack performance under these protocols.
Attack performance is measured differently according to the different attack targets. For KA and
TMA, we use the model accuracy as the metric for characterizing attack performance. Higher model
accuracy indicates stronger robustness. For MPA, we use the percentage of the remembered back-
doors to represent the attack performance. The fewer backdoors remembered, the more robust the
estimator is. FilterL2 used in the evaluation is the accelerated version as discussed in Section 4.1.
5.3 EVALUATION RESULTS
FilterL2 Performance. To answer question (1), we evaluated 6 aggregators on MNIST and Fash-
ionMNIST as shown in Figure 1. We ran the protocols with 20 clients, five of which are malicious
under attacks. Note that the number of the malicious clients actually exceeds the bound in Theo-
rem 3 because some attacks only work with enough malicious clients. Not surprisingly, FilterL2
achieves optimal performance among all 6 aggregators. Besides, FilterL2 is the only aggregator that
consistently achieves good performance under all three attacks. The superiority of FilterL2 is owed
to its quad-root estimation error. Due to the theoretically stronger robustness, it is extremely hard to
design targeted attacks for FilterL2 like Krum or trimmed mean.
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Figure 1: Attack performance under different Byzantine-robust estimators.
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F2ED-LEARNING Performance. To answer question (2), we evaluated six aggregatorswith shard-
ing on MNIST and FashionMNIST as shown in Figure 2. We ran the protocols with 100 clients, ten
of which are malicious under attacks. The 100 clients were randomly split into 25 shards. For the
experiments without attack, with TMA or with MPA (Figure 2a,2c,2d,2e.2g,2h), F2ED-LEARNING
still achieves optimal or sub-optimal performance. An interesting phenomenon is that KA can be
successfully defended by all aggregators when the clients are sharded (Figure 2b,2f). The reason
is that KA is targeted at Krum without sharding and wants to maximize the probability that a ma-
licious update is chosen by Krum. Once integrated with sharding, Krum selects from the averaged
updates from the shards, and thus the effect of the malicious update is diluted. This demonstrates
that sharding itself can defend against some attacks by diluting the effect of malicious updates.
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Figure 2: Attack performance under different estimators with sharded secure aggregation.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the updates before/after sharding. The x-axis
denotes the update vector components and the y-axis is its appearing fre-
quency.
From non-IID to IID. To
answer question (3), we sim-
ulate heterogeneous data dis-
tribution by assigning MNIST
samples with different labels
to 25 clients. These clients
are split into 5 shards. We
plot the distributions of the up-
dates before and after sharding
as shown in Figure 3. Each
line represents the weight dis-
tribution within one update.
Figure 3a plots five updates
from the same shard and Fig-
ure 3b plots the averaged up-
dates from the five shards. It is obvious that after sharding the distributions are more densely and
identically distributed as discussed in Section 4.3.
6 CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper, we designed and developed F2ED-LEARNING, the first federated learning protocol
defending against an honest but curious server and Byzantine malicious clients simultaneously. We
propose to use FilterL2 to robustly aggregate the possibly contaminated updates and secure aggrega-
tion to protect the privacy of the clients. We reconcile the contradictory components with sharding.
The evaluation results show that F2ED-LEARNING consistently achieves the optimal or sub-optimal
performance among five robust FL protocols. As far as we can see, F2ED-LEARNING addresses the
two main privacy threats in FL systems simultaneously and shows the potential to further popularize
FL in sensitive applications.
We also identify several unsolved challenges in F2ED-LEARNING which might motivate future
works in FL with two-way protection. For instance, vanilla FilterL2 brings large overhead due
to its high complexity. Although the accelerated FilterL2 partially addresses the issue, it sacrifices
the asymptotic estimation error for the speedup. An interesting future direction is to integrate robust
mean estimators with low complexity such as Cheng et al. (2019). However, Cheng et al. (2019)’s
approach is rather complicated so designing low-complexity robust mean estimator with simple in-
tuition is also an intriguing direction.
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